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Abstract 
 
The idea that network structure and embeddedness affect firms’ competitive behavior and performance is 
not new both in network literature and in strategic management literature. This study recognizes that the 
possibility to fully exploit network opportunities is depending on firm specialization choices. 
By analyzing network embeddedness within the European investment banking industry, I find that banks 
enhance performance by having a central position in their network and that specialization reduces bank’s 
benefits of having a central position in the network. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that network structure and embeddedness affect firms’ competitive behavior and 
performance is well acknowledged both in network literature (Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
1988; Granovetter, 1973) and in strategic management literature (Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan, 
2006; Hagedoorn et al., 2006; Echols and Tsai, 2005; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Gnyawali and 
Madhavan, 2001; Gulati et al., 2000; Gulati, 1999; Cravens et al., 1996). There is substantial 
agreement for treating networks as a source of external resources upon which the firm can draw 
in its strategic actions and enhance its performance.  
In considering performance-related outcomes great attention has also been paid to important 
features of ties, or relationships, within networks (Cross and  Cummings, 2004; Adler and Kwon, 
2002; Higgins and Kram, 2001; Monge and Contractor, 2001). What is suggested is that one of 
the most important mechanisms for increasing performance is firms’ ability to use network ties 
for accessing information about opportunities and choices that are otherwise not available to 
them. However, analyzing performance at the firm level, literature has considered firms’ 
strategic resource endowments (Peteraf, 1993; Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1991). From this point 
of view, each firm is idiosyncratic because of differences in resources and assets acquired over 
time and because of the routines developed to manage them. If a favourable position in the 
network gives the firms the potential to access the information on the existence of diverse 
opportunities, the possibility to fully exploit these opportunities is depending on the presence of 
some firm-specific characteristics (Shipilov, 2006; Lee et al., 2001).  
According to Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) “absorptive capacity” concept, firms’ ability to get 
knowledge and information from their external environment is a function of the firms’ 
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specialization choices and experiences. In particular, firms operating in many market segments 
are likely to possess more internal capabilities than firms operating in few market segments 
since, as the volume and complexity of information in the environment increase, the organization 
needs to have correspondingly high levels of information processing capacity (Miller and Chen, 
1994; Hambrick, 1982; Khandwalla, 1973). Implicit in this arguments there is the question: 
“Have all firms the same possibility to benefit from a favourable network position?”. 
In sum, this study points the fact that simply having access to information about the existence of 
business opportunities is not sufficient to permit their exploitation without the possibility to use 
this information, due to the lack of internal capabilities.  
Based on these considerations I attempt to investigate how network position can influence 
performance of firms and how firm-specific characteristics can mediate this relation by asking: 
“Does network position influence performance of its members?” and “How specialization 
choices could influence this network position – performance relation?”. 
I examine these aspects studying network position and specialization of actors operating in the 
investment banking industry in Euro area, using data on syndicates formed by 78 banks 
underwriting public offerings during the years 2004-2005. 
This paper uniquely contribute to the banking strategic management literature showing that the 
effect of particular network positions on banking performance depends on bank-level 
characteristics. This finding suggests that managers need to assess a firm’s ability to get 
knowledge and information from their external environment and make adjustments based on firm 
alliance portfolios. The study proceeds as follows.  
In the first section I develop theory and hypotheses. Following I outline my study setting and 
methodology, and present results. Finally, I present implications, limits and conclusions. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Several studies have shown that differential access to network resources leads to resource 
asymmetries between the firms, to differences in competitive behaviour and therefore to different 
performance levels. A substantial body of literature has analyzed both the contingencies under 
which one network structure is more beneficial relative to the other (Burt, 2007; Soda et al., 
2004; Ahuja, 2000; Rowley et al., 2000; Podolny 1993) and the relations between firms’ network 
position (deriving from ties with other firms) and performance (Almeida et al.,, 2003; Lee et al., 
2001; Powell et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000).  
In synthesis, relationships in a network are potential sources of firm internal resources (Langlois, 
1992; Nohria, 1992), whose effectiveness is dependent by network structure (Burt, 1992) and by 
internal capabilities (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Following, quality and relevance of 
information and resources deriving from favourable networks positions can improve a firm’s 
performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004). 
In fact, an important feature of network ties is that they function as “pipelines” through which 
information’ and resources’ flows are exchanged among firms (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). 
The strategic contingencies and resource dependency frameworks (Hickson et al., 1971; Salancik 
and Pfeffer, 1977) posit that power derives from the control of relevant resources. This concept 
of control by one single actor implies that others in the network have few alternative sources for 
acquiring the resource, such that the actor controls or mediates others’ access to the resource. 
Centrality in the network is the extent to which an actor controls or is deeply involved in these 
network flows (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980).  
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If networks provide channels for the exchange of information and resources then central firms 
can use these channels to reach key information and resources that enhance, from one side, the 
knowledge about strategies and resources of competing firms, even in the absence of any asset 
flows (Harrigan, 1986) and, from the other side, power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980). 
Actors occupying central positions in a network are viewed as potentially powerful because of 
their greater access to and possible control over relevant resources (Boje and Whetten, 1981). 
Central firms enjoy advantages from network position also because their resource superiority 
reduces competitors’ likelihood of response (Chen, 1996) as less central competitors will find it 
more difficult and costly to give a response because their limited information set. In addition, 
since central competitors are more prestigious and more powerful, other firms are less likely to 
want to provoke them. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms enhance performance by having a central position in their network 
 
Moreover, strategic management literature recognizes that the feasibility of a competitive 
strategy depends on the availability of firm-specific resources (Barnett et al., 1994; Haunschild 
and Ni, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) whose combinations may be an ex-ante condition or a 
constraint more or less stringent (Mottura, 2006). 
In further detail, the importance of firms’ information processing ability is generally recognized 
(Cross and Cummings, 2004; Smith et al., 1991). The theory of organizational information 
processing (Tushman and Nadler, 1978) suggests that as the volume and complexity of 
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information in the environment increase, the organization needs to have correspondingly high 
levels of information processing capacity. 
One of the most important firms’ features, depending on the availability of firm-specific 
resources, regards the level of diversification / specialization on different market segments 
(Shipilov, 2006; Haunschild and Ni, 2003; Grant, 2001; Barnett, Greve and Park, 1994). 
Since firms operating in different market segments (generalists) are exposed to a large amount of 
information from multiple environments, they are likely to possess the internal capabilities 
needed to acquire and use network resources more efficiently and effectively than do firms 
operating in few market segments (specialists) (Miller and Chen 1994; Hambrick, 1982; 
Khandwalla, 1973). 
Specifically, market diversity exposes firms to a great variety of ideas and events that prompt 
exploration and change (Khandwalla 1973) and to a broad range of competitive options 
(Hambrick, 1982) that increase knowledge about the possibilities of their environment. An 
homogeneous learning environment could limit information acquisition and may foster inertia 
(Miller and Chen 1994). 
Two important considerations can be made at this regard. At first, because network centrality 
provides greater volume of information from various sources, an increase in centrality would 
mean the need for a corresponding increase in information processing capacity. Furthermore, 
diversified firms with high network centrality could be better able to benefit from information 
received from partners since the capacity to exploit the advantages of new opportunities in 
different market segments than do specialist firms. The latter, concentrating their business in a 
few industry segments have a deep understanding of these segments but a lack of capabilities 
useful for the other market segments and this circumstance doesn’t allow them to fully capitalize 
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the opportunities deriving from a central position in the network.  In other terms, specialization 
can affect a firm’s ability to engage in information and referrals exchange within networks, as 
well as its ability to benefit from this exchange. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Specialization reduces a firm’s benefits of having a central position in the network  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
I tested my hypotheses in the investment banking industry, where banks create network ties as a 
result of their participation in syndicates that underwrite issues of initial public offerings (IPOs). 
Coalitions between rival underwriters with complementary abilities provide mutual benefits and 
enhance the underwriting services for the clients. Banks form syndicates in order to facilitate the 
placement of new securities and to reduce financial risks to individual underwriters (Song, 
2004).  
Banks that act as lead managers usually contribute for a great part of the capital required to fund 
issues. The rest of the capital is contributed by other syndicate members, whose participation is 
important for reducing risks to individual banks and for broadening the distribution of shares to 
different investor groups (Forestieri, 2005). 
The possibility that a bank become involved in a syndicate depends on the relationships that this 
bank maintains (considered as a sort of “social capital”) and on how it is able to use these 
connections, based on its internal capabilities (Shipilov, 2006).  
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The quality of connections helps banks in central positions (considered as brokers in the 
network) to obtain invitations to participate in a variety of deals and, in this way, to have access 
to a wide variety of syndication opportunities across different industries. This condition can 
enhance performance of banks as a result of the increased trading that their partners are likely to 
generate.  
Moreover, network centrality enables both specialists and generalists to access a wide variety of 
partners that can be invited to join a syndicate but, because a greater ability to exploit access to 
heterogeneous sources of invitations, generalist banks have a better possibility to operate in 
different market segments than specialist banks (Pollock et al., 2004). 
In fact the possibility to get and to use information on business opportunities is contingent upon 
banks’ structures and often generalists’ internal resources are useful in a greater number of 
industries than specialists’ ones (Rosenberg, 1982).  
This means that when generalist banks receive invitations from their partners to exploit 
opportunities in diverse market segments, they are more likely to accept since they already 
operate in these segments. On the contrary, specialist banks are able to get fewer benefits from 
invitations that they receive since internal capabilities are segment-specific. 
The only time that a specialist can take advantage from invitations is when they involve 
opportunities in the proper sector of expertise. In this sense a bank high specialization level could 
reduce the benefits of having a central position because of the lack of internal capabilities give 
less opportunity to exploit centrality.  
In other terms specialists can construct syndicates only in their narrow sectors of specialization, 
generalists can lead syndicates issuing securities in various market segments. Specialists’ 
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constricted focus can again contribute to their underutilization of opportunities deriving by 
network position.  
 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
I tested my hypotheses using data on syndicates formed by all banks underwriting public 
offerings in Euro area during the years 2004-2005. For the purposes of my analysis I considered 
in the regression model a representative sample (83% based on 2005 data) of 78 banks 
participating in both the years. In this observation period, these banks underwrote 234 issues and 
formed 194 syndicates. 
In order to find out network characteristics in this industry I used life history information on all 
offerings placed by banks in 2004 and in 2005 from various European stock exchanges and from 
database Zephyr (Bureau van Dijk). After I defined inter-bank networks considering banks’ 
memberships in underwriting syndicates and organized my data into socio-matrices. To test my 
hypotheses I used the following regression equation model: 
 
MKT_SHAREt = β0 + β1*MKT_SHAREt-1 + β2*SPECIALIZATIO3 + β3*CE3TRALITY + 
β4*SPECIALIZATIO3* CE3TRALITY + ε 
 
 
One of the most important indicators of performance in investment banking industry is market 
share since it places underwriters in the rankings, called league tables, used to compare banks in 
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this industry (Li and Rowley, 2002; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Dunbar, 2000; Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1994; Podolny, 1993; Eccles and Crane, 1988). 
Following this approach, I considered market share at time t (dependent variable) as performance 
indicator for banks. In addiction, market share at time t-1 was used as control variable for my 
analysis. 
I measured banks’ market shares at time t and at time t-1 allocating the euro value of each 
offering made during the year among the members of the syndicate that underwrote the deal. If a 
deal did not involve a syndicate, to the only bank (lead manager) I assigned 100 percent of the 
offering’s value. If a deal involved multiple syndicate members, I spitted the underwriting value 
among members equally. To compute banks’ market shares, I then divided each bank’s deal 
values by the total value of public offerings for each year.  
My main theoretical variables were a measure of the bank’s specialization and a measure for the 
centrality in a bank’s network.  
Following Shipilov (2006), to compute specialization I used Herfindahl index: at first I defined 
market segments on the basis of the sector of the economy in which banks underwrote public 
offerings. After, basing on NACE codes I identified ten major segments that were used to 
compute the specialization index. 
When this measure approached 0, it indicated that a particular bank underwrote deals in all ten 
market sectors and was thus a generalist; when this measure approached 1, the bank was a 
specialist. 
Because of the reciprocal nature of the relationships among a generic bank i and a generic bank j 
in a syndicate, I measured these in symmetric socio-matrices, wherein cell ij was coded “1” if 
there was a link between banks and “0” otherwise. 
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I computed centrality using betweenness measure considering banks’ participation in syndicates 
and using the software UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). 
In general, centrality of an actor refers to a role of mediation and brokerage within the network 
that derives from a position that give more possibilities to control resources and to connect 
subgroups. In particular, betweenness (Freeman, 1977) refers to how often an actor network is in 
the shortest route to reach the other actors, regardless of the direction of the report (or out). A 
growing value of betweenness increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to influence 
the interaction between the other actors.  
Moreover, in order to test hypotheses involving nonlinear effects of theoretical variables, my 
model contained interaction of linear terms of a main effect variable with a moderating variable. 
Specifically, my variable of interest was the interaction term between linear terms of 
specialization and centrality To check whether correlations between main effects and interactions 
affected results, I computed the model’s average variance inflation factors (VIF). 
Table 1 summarizes these variables. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
The analysis of the estimated regression coefficients in model allowed the test of my hypotheses. 
In detail, the following hypotheses are verified if: 
- Hypothesis 1: coefficient β3 is positive and statistically significant; 
- Hypothesis 2: coefficient β4 is negative and statistically significant. 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents maximum, minimum, means, standard deviations and correlations among 
variables included in the analysis. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Further, I tested the hypotheses using the regression equation model (defined above) that 
modelled the influence of specialization and betweenness variables, the interaction between 
linear terms of specialization and betweenness and the control variable (market share t-1) on 
banks’ market share t (see Table 3). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Hypothesis 1 (banks enhance performance by having a central position in their network) is 
strongly supported (β3 = 0,00025; p < 0,01). 
Hypothesis 2 (specialization reduces bank’s benefits of having a central position in the network) 
is also supported (β4 = -0,00059; p < 0,01). 
The value R
2
 adjusted for the model is 0,571 while the F statistic is to 26,631 and significance of 
the model is confirmed. Model’s average variance inflation factors (VIF) is within an acceptable 
range (6,46). 
I have considered the possibility that the relationships between centrality and firm performance 
are reciprocal. In fact, while centrality does contribute to firm performance, a high firm 
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performance can in turn improve the centrality of the firm, because high-performing firms attract 
invitations from fellow firms. To show the robustness of results, I applied a 2SLS simultaneous 
equations approach: since the OLS and 2SLS results are qualitatively similar, this analysis failed 
to support the assertion that banks’ performance affects centrality
1
.  
  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study attempted to examine the relationship among position in the network, firm level 
specific features and performance.  
By considering the social processes that underlie the formation of IPO syndicates in investment 
banking industry, I examined performance’s consequences of underwriters’ different levels of 
specialization in terms of opportunities that they can extract from their network-building 
activities. 
Results provide evidence that the ability of firms to benefit from their positions within networks 
is contingent upon the levels of specialization and underline that together network boundaries 
and internal capabilities influence performance. From strategists’ viewpoint, the study shows the 
importance of combining internal mechanisms and network mechanisms, recognizing the 
importance of network connections’ quality. The study also shows the combined effect of 
specialization and centrality on a bank’s performance. As hypothesized, benefits associated with 
centrality in the network can be reduced by high levels of specialization. My contribution 
highlights at least two important issues: 
                                                 
1
 These results are available upon request. 
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- network access automatically doesn’t means information access but the latter is also 
dependent on the quality of network ties; 
- ability to exploit network information or, better, network opportunities is conditioned by 
internal resources of firms and more specifically the “absorptive capacity”. When the 
absorptive capacity is high, centrality is likely to result in high firm performance. In 
contrast, when absorptive capacity is low, the centrality-performance relationship is 
likely to be less positive or even negative. 
 
Managers should consider the fit among a firm’s ability to get knowledge and information from 
their external environment in their alliance building activity. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to researchers’ understanding of the IPO market’s operations 
analyzing the performance consequences of the social processes that underlie the formation of 
IPO syndicates. Form banks’ viewpoint, not recognizing the importance of a fit between their 
own characteristics and network position could result in strategic decisions detrimental to 
alliance-building behaviour and performance. Therefore it is particularly important for banks 
operating in investment banking to consider both i) the value of having a central position in the 
network and ii) the cooperation with actors which possess the capabilities to provide useful 
knowledge/opportunities. 
As for other researches, also this study has several limitations. At first, I used market share as a 
dependent variable ignoring other performance measures such as profitability or shareholder 
value. However in investment banking, market share reflects banks’ ability to earn underwriting 
fees that contribute to the return on financial assets, and consequently profitability. In addiction, 
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I also didn’t use alternative specifications of banks’ market shares (for example, assigning 25, 50 
or 75 percent of a syndicate’s value to lead managers). 
In addition, my specialization measure could be limited by considering only one particular 
segment of the investment banking industry (underwriting public offerings), since I was not able 
to measure the involvement of banks in other important areas such as merger and acquisition, 
corporate bonds emissions, advisory, etc. 
Yet, the definition of inter-bank networks considers only banks’ memberships in underwriting 
syndicates and doesn’t account for other levels of analysis. In fact, other types of links, such as 
interlocking directorates and friendship networks between individuals across banks, might also 
be noteworthy conduits for the transfer of information and knowledge. 
Finally, although the primary focus of my analysis was the moderating effects of specialization 
on the relationship between network embeddedness and performance, other important questions 
could be raised. In particular, an interesting area for future research regards the possibility that 
dynamic changes in network embeddedness take place as a function of reputation or in response 
to emerging competitive challenges and opportunities. As a consequence, another important 
research area is the way through which specialization choices and, more generally, internal 
capabilities constrain or improve the ability to reconfigure network ties when changes occur in 
competitive environment. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study belongs to that field of research examining the impact of a firm’s network position on 
performance from a contingent point of view.  
The focus is given to the banks’ strategic advantage deriving from exploiting a central position in 
the networks of relationships among competing banks. Simply having access to information 
about the existence of business opportunities is not sufficient to permit their exploitation, without 
the possibility to use this information due to the lack of internal capabilities. In fact firms’ ability 
to use network ties for accessing information about opportunities and choices otherwise not 
available is depending on internal resource endowments and in particular by “absortive 
capacity”. 
Implicit in these arguments is the question if are all banks equally able to benefit from a central 
network position and this study accounts for both network and bank-specific factors influencing 
performance. 
Based on the investigation of network position and specialization levels of actors operating in the 
investment banking industry in Europe, using data on syndicates formed by 78 banks 
underwriting public offerings during the years 2004-2005, I find that banks enhance performance 
by having a central position in their network and that high specialization levels reduce a bank’s 
benefits of having a central position in the network. 
There are strong theoretical reasons to propose a contingent role of network’s features with 
banks’ characteristics in enhancing performance.  
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TABLE 1 
Variable specifications 
Variable Specification 
Dependent variable  
Performance  Bank’s market share in period t. 
  
Main effects  
Specialization  Herfindahl index of market presence. 
Centrality Freeman (1977) betweenness measure 
Specialization * 
Centrality Interaction term between linear terms of specialization and centrality 
  
Control variable  
Past performance Bank’s market share in period t-1 
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TABLE 2
a
 
Mean, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
a. Pairwise correlations are presented.
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 
MKT_SHAREt 0,01 0,02     
MKT_SHAREt-1 0,01 0,01 0,70    
SPECIALIZATIO3 0,66 0,33 -0,54 -0,46   
CE3TRALITY 15,29 39,11 0,42 0,29 -0,41  
SPECIALIZATIO3  
X  
CE3TRALITY 
4,72 12,46 0,29 0,19 -0,31 0,95 
 25 
 
TABLE 3
a
 
Predictors of banks’ market share 
Variable Coefficients 
I3TERCEPT 0,00799** 
MKT_SHAREt-1 0,65105*** 
SPECIALIZATIO3 -0,00822** 
CE3TRALITY 0,00025** 
SPECIALIZATIO3 X 
CE3TRALITY 
-0,00059** 
  
3umber of observations 78 
R2 0,593 
R2 Adjusted 0,571 
F Statistic 26,631*** 
Average VIF 6,46 
 
a. Coefficients and t statistics listed 
† p < 0,10 
* p < 0,05 
** p < 0,01 
*** p< 0,001 
